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Textual Privacy and Mobile Information
SIMON STERN*
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Marakah attempted to resolve the privacy 
status of text messages under section 8 of the Charter, but offered an incomplete solution 
because it failed to address the normative basis for protecting such communications. Despite 
the complexity of section 8 analysis (which itself is a product of multiple and inconsistent 
tests used to answer the same questions), the privacy of text messages allows for a relatively 
simple analysis. Normatively speaking, letters, email, and text messages all attract the 
same basic privacy interest, and should be treated analogously. However, if the police 
have objective grounds for believing that particular individuals have been exchanging text 
messages in furtherance of a crime, reasonable suspicion may justify a limited search, 
aimed solely at obtaining those messages. This approach protects the public from random 
and baseless police searches while giving the police access to these communications when 
there are objective grounds to believe they will disclose evidence of crime.
* Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. For comments on previous drafts, thanks to Vincent 
Chiao, Dan Priel, Martha Shaffer, and the Journal’s two anonymous referees.
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ALTHOUGH EMAIL AND TEXTING are no longer particularly novel forms of 
communication, the questions they pose for the law of search and seizure 
continue to create difficulties for the courts. These difficulties are particularly 
acute when the prosecution seeks to use electronic communications as evidence 
in criminal cases. The discussion in this article focuses on what I will call “mobile 
information”—text messages, email, and similar transmissions which, having 
been created to travel across media, are not embedded uniquely in a single 
physical device but may be found in various places outside of the sender’s custody 
or control, such as on the phone or computer of the addressee or a further 
recipient, or on a restricted or open-access web site. When obtained from any 
source, through a duly authorized search or in circumstances where no search has 
occurred, such evidence does not present difficult questions about admissibility. 
But when the police acquire mobile evidence during an unauthorized search of 
the recipient, the question arises whether the sender has a privacy interest in 
the information itself that justifies excluding the evidence, even though it was 
not obtained from the claimant. If mobile information is taken from a device 
that belongs to the claimant, through an unauthorized search, its mobility is 
insignificant: The privacy interest in the device covers any information extracted 
during the search. When the device belongs to a third party, on the other hand, 
it matters fundamentally whether the claimant has a privacy interest in the 
information itself. In what follows, I propose a framework for evaluating such 
privacy claims.
The framework proposed here differs, in some fundamental respects, from 
the one adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Marakah.1 Marakah 
involved an unauthorized search of a co-conspirator’s iPhone in the course of an 
investigation for conspiracy to engage in illegal firearms sales. The police, having 
obtained a warrant to search the suspects’ homes, seized Marakah’s Blackberry 
and the iPhone of his co-accused, and found incriminating text messages on both 
devices. The warrants were held to be invalid, but the application judge admitted 
the text messages, and both men were convicted.2 Marakah argued that he had 
an ongoing privacy interest in the text messages, even after their delivery, but 
the trial and appellate courts rejected that contention.3 In a majority opinion by 
Chief Justice McLachlin, the Court reversed the lower court decisions, adopting 
Marakah’s view. However, the Court made no effort to analogize text messages to 
other forms of written communication, thereby failing to address the normative 
1. R v Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, 42 CR (7th) 1 [Marakah].
2. Ibid at paras 2, 3.
3. See R v Marakah, 2016 ONCA 542, 131 OR (3d) 561 [Marakah, ONCA].
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basis for the privacy interest in question. Instead, the majority drew on three 
considerations in a fashion that aims to establish a privacy interest in text messages 
as a general matter, but in effect leaves open the possibility that in a given case, 
the particular circumstances may eradicate that interest.
First as to the “place” of the search, the Court observed that text messaging, 
no matter where it occurs, can serve to “create private chat rooms between 
individuals,”4 and that when it does, this factor supports the sender’s privacy 
interest. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that texting does not always occur 
within a secluded zone, and concluded that “different facts may well lead to a 
different result.”5 “Place,” then, may enhance or diminish the sender’s privacy 
interest, depending on the circumstances.6 Second, as to the sender’s “control” 
over the object of the search, the Court stated that after the message has been 
delivered, the sender’s privacy interest may persist by virtue of her “shared 
control” over it, as when someone shares control over their office computer with 
an employer who also has access to it.7 The better answer, however, is that control 
has little significance in this analysis, just as it does when the police are searching 
for letters. People generally cannot control what the recipient does with a letter, 
but the sender’s privacy interest does not vanish upon delivery: The police are 
not free to seize letters, on a warrantless basis, from any of the places where they 
might be found.8 That answer would help to show why text messages generally 
attract a privacy interest—the point that Marakah seeks to establish. Basing 
that interest on the sender’s persisting control, instead, has the undesirable effect 
of conceding that where the Crown can show definitively that such control is 
lacking, the privacy interest wanes.
4. Ibid at para 28 [emphasis omitted].
5. Marakah, supra note 1 at para 55. As the Court explained, “messages posted on social 
media, … [or] in crowded Internet chat rooms, or … on online message boards” do not 
attract a privacy interest; more generally, various factual circumstances, relating to how 
and where the message is sent or read, can also eliminate the privacy interest (ibid). A vast 
array of contingencies that may have that effect, and so the possibility of “a different result” 
necessarily depends on the facts of the case (ibid).
6. One might read Marakah as making this point directly—as, for instance, when the Court 
observes that “[t]he place of the search is simply one of several factors that must be weighed” 
(ibid at para 30). However, given that the Court singled out three factors for discussion, 
rather than reviewing all of the potentially relevant factors to separate the inconclusive ones 
from the others, the Court evidently meant to confer on these three a significance that 
the others lacked.
7. Ibid at para 42 (likening the “shared control aspect of this case” to one of an employee 
whose “employer … could [also] access the contents of the computer”). The sender of a text 
message, however, does not necessarily have any access to the recipient’s device.
8. For further discussion, see the text accompanying notes 78-80 below.
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Last, the Court observed that because text messages can “reveal[] a great deal 
of private information,”9 this factor also supports a continuing privacy interest. 
Here, the Court comes closest to setting out a normative justification, but stops 
short, instead making a descriptive statement about the messages’ content.10 
Notice that postcards do not typically reveal highly intimate personal details, 
and yet most people would not consider them any more open than letters to 
random search, if the police seize them without legal authorization from the 
recipient’s briefcase or residence—nor has any Canadian court ruled otherwise.11 
Conversely, credit card transactions may be highly revealing, and yet no Canadian 
court has ruled that they attract a strong privacy interest, as a general matter.12 
The likelihood of revealing personal information, however important, does 
not seem to be the crucial feature. Marakah relies on two factors—place and 
control—that yield variable results, depending on the circumstances, and one 
factor that cannot, by itself, establish a normative ground for a general privacy 
interest in text messages.
In this article, I propose such an account, drawing on the similar social 
norms relating to various forms of written communication. In brief, I suggest 
that text messages cannot be normatively differentiated from letters, and that 
they both carry a certain basic privacy interest on the sender’s part, because that 
9. Marakah, supra note 1 at para 37.
10. In so doing, the majority misconstrues Marshall McLuhan’s famous observation that “the 
medium is the message,” ibid at para 33 quoting Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: 
The Extensions of Man (New York: McGrawHill, 1964) at 7. As McLuhan explained, “it is the 
medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action” (ibid 
at 9). McLuhan’s point was that the same content carries a different meaning, when read in 
the paper, or heard on the radio, or seen on the television (or, he might have added, read on 
the internet) because those different media shape and control content in different ways. But 
the Marakah majority takes this in precisely the opposite fashion, reasoning that the content 
is the message, and that it thereby determines the significance of the medium. According 
to the Court, “[t]he medium of text messaging broadcasts a wealth of personal information 
capable of revealing personal and core biological information,” and this tendency to convey 
private content helps to establish a privacy interest in the medium that conveys it (Marakah, 
supra note 1 at para 33). This may be a sound legal conclusion, but McLuhan offers no help 
in establishing it.
11. There is little jurisprudence concerning protection for postcards, but see Justice Michelle 
Fuerst, Michal Fairburn & Scott Fenton, “Warrantless search of cell phone text messages 
may violate message sender’s reasonable expectation of privacy” (16 October 2015), 
Insider (blog), online: Thomson Reuters <www.westlawnextcanada.com/blog/insider/
police-powers-expectation-of-privacy-466> (commenting on R v Pelucco, 2015 BCCA 370, 
376 BCAC 226 [Pelucco], and observing that “post card[s] [and] letter[s]” generally attract an 
expectation of privacy).
12. For further discussion, see the text accompanying note 42 below.
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is an interest “that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”13 That basic 
privacy interest is sufficient to protect against random and groundless searches. 
The police are no more entitled to undertake baseless, large-scale searches of 
mobile phones, in the hope of finding text messages that would incriminate the 
sender, than to undertake searches for any other form of written correspondence 
to acquire documents that incriminate the sender. The interests that animate 
privacy rights generally in this area—the autonomy, integrity, and dignity 
interests of individuals in a free and democratic society14—would be radically 
eroded if people had to assume that whenever they communicate with others, 
the content is presumptively open to random search by the police, unsupported 
by any articulable justification, whenever the content is preserved in a form that 
persists after the communication has been received.
Nevertheless, I suggest, the situation is very different when the police have 
reasonable suspicion to believe that certain individuals are involved in a serious 
crime. “A ‘reasonable’ suspicion means something more than a mere suspicion 
and something less than a belief based upon reasonable and probable grounds.”15 
Like the higher standard, however, it must be “based on objectively discernible 
facts.”16 Courts have used the standard of reasonable suspicion to permit limited 
searches, such as a frisk or pat-down.17 Analogously, this may provide a sufficient 
basis for a search of the recipient’s mobile device, aimed specifically at yielding the 
text messages relevant to the crime, and focused on obtaining only those messages.
In Part I, I show why questions of informational privacy, unlike most 
other varieties, have traditionally been hard to answer categorically, under the 
Court’s jurisprudence, and have often been answered contingently—which is 
to say that particular examples are often analyzed individually when challenged 
in court. As a result, both the public and the police may have great difficulty 
ascertaining the privacy interest that attaches to a given item (e.g., an email or 
a text message), leaving the public unsure about their rights, and frustrating the 
ability of the police to do their jobs effectively. In Marakah, the Court sought to 
offer a categorical solution to the treatment of text messages, but the decision 
13. R v M(A), 2008 SCC 19 at para 33, [2008] 1 SCR 569 citing Katz v United States, 389 US 
347 (1967) [Katz].
14. See e.g. Hunter v Southam, [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 159, 11 DLR (4th) 641 [Hunter]; R v Plant, 
[1993] 3 SCR 281 at 293, 157 NR 321 [Plant].
15. R v Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18 at para 75, [2008] 1 SCR 456 [Kang-Brown].
16. R v Chehil, 2013 SCC 49 at para 26, [2013] 3 SCR 220 [Chehil].
17. See e.g. R v Solomon, 2014 ONSC 6857 at para 88, 118 WCB (2d) 259; R v Atkins, 2013 
ONCA 586 at paras 14-15, 210 OAC 397; R v Tyndale, 2010 ONSC 1744 at paras 105-06, 
208 CRR (2d) 272.
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does not achieve this effect, unless the “personal information” strand of the 
analysis has the power, by itself, to resolve the question. In further elaboration 
of this problem, I then distinguish, in Part II, between spatial and informational 
privacy, both as a general matter, and more specifically with respect to the Court’s 
jurisprudence. Next, in Part III, I turn to the Court’s privacy jurisprudence, 
focusing specifically on two of the prevailing tests, set out in Edwards and Plant. 
Part III also confronts the “lack of control” theory adopted by some courts, and 
by the dissent in Marakah. On that view, once the sender loses control over 
the message, the privacy interest accordingly vanishes. The majority in Marakah 
evaded this argument, reasoning that the sender and recipient may have “shared 
control” over the message.18 But that answer seems to concede that without such 
control, the sender has no privacy interest. As will become evident, this theory 
crumbles upon scrutiny, because once we look to the social norms concerning 
written correspondence, we see that control is not a very significant consideration 
when assessing the sender’s privacy interest. Finally, in Part IV, I turn to the 
normative grounds for concluding that individuals have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in text messages, but I show, in Part IV(B), how the standard of 
“reasonable suspicion” may be applied so as to permit the police limited access to 
only those text messages for which there are objectively ascertainable grounds to 
believe that they were exchanged in furtherance of a crime.
In the ensuing discussion, I consider an array of problems arising in this area, 
but I focus on informational privacy in text messages—an issue that accentuates, 
with unusual clarity, the problem of the categorical and the contingent. To show 
why, and to specify more precisely the questions these cases raise, it will help to 
describe a common scenario—essentially the one that arose in Marakah. Having 
identified several suspects in a conspiracy to sell or distribute contraband, the 
police proceed to search them. The incriminating evidence that emerges includes 
text messages relating to the conspiracy, sent between the suspects. It eventually 
transpires that legal authorization to obtain the messages was lacking—either 
because they were outside the scope of an authorized search, or because the 
police acted without a valid warrant and without a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement. Nevertheless, when each suspect moves to exclude that 
evidence, the prosecution responds that none of them may contest the search of 
another’s phone; thus a message sent from A to B, and retrieved from B’s phone, 
is admissible against A. The defendants reply that a reasonable expectation 
of privacy accompanies all text messages no matter where they travel, and 
that because there was no legal authorization for the search, the messages are 
18. See the text accompanying supra note 7 above.
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inadmissible. Formerly, the prosecution would have replied that no one has 
any reasonable expectation of privacy in a text message. Now, after Marakah, 
the prosecution would assert that the accused has no privacy interest in these 
particular text messages (so long as any of the factors singled out in Marakah tilt 
in the other direction). Thus the defence would propose a categorical answer and 
the prosecution would reply that the analysis is contingent—i.e., that it depends 
on the particular circumstances of the case.
I. THE CATEGORICAL AND THE CONTINGENT
To make sense of the legal landscape in this area, it will help to begin by 
distinguishing between two kinds of problems that arise in the law of search 
and seizure. Some of these problems can be resolved categorically and others—
under the existing jurisprudence—tend to be resolved contingently. The concern 
to balance privacy and security prompts the courts, when considering the 
legitimacy of a search, to undertake a complex multifactor analysis that includes 
a careful and measured appraisal of each component, and that often turns on 
contentious claims about objectively justified understandings of privacy.19 This 
elaborate and nuanced approach is best suited for questions that can be answered 
categorically—that is, questions about the privacy interest in places or things, 
19. See e.g. Katz, supra note 19 at 361 (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation 
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”) (Harlan J, concurring); 
R v Patrick, 2009 SCC 17 at para 17, [2009] 1 SCR 579 [Patrick]. On the contentious 
nature of these ascriptions, consider, e.g., the observation that “[p]rivacy analysis is laden 
with value judgments which are made from the independent perspective of the reasonable 
and informed person who is concerned about the long-term consequences of government 
action for the protection of privacy” (ibid at para 14). The disputable nature of these 
judgments was demonstrated long ago in a study revealing widespread disagreement between 
the US Supreme Court and the public as to the extent of the privacy interest in various 
activities that have figured in the jurisprudence. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E 
Schumacher, “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment 
Cases: An Empirical Look at ‘Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society’” (1993) 
42:4 Duke LJ 727.
STERN,  TExTUAL PRIVACY AND MOBILE INFORMATION 405
such as lockers, backpacks, and mobile phones, as a class.20 When such a question 
arises for the first time and a court conducts a balancing analysis, the result is to 
specify the privacy interest in all members of the class. When the question next 
arises, rather than having to inquire anew into the totality of circumstances, the 
court need only refer to the categorical answer supplied earlier.
That categorical answer has the great advantage of yielding a bright-line rule 
for the police and the public. Because the first backpack case effectively deals with 
virtually all future cases (subject to various exceptions that also apply generally 
in the law of search and seizure), the decision enables people to assess, with a 
fair degree of accuracy, whether a prospective search of a backpack would be 
legally valid, and on what grounds. Where the courts can deliver a categorical 
answer, specifying the privacy protection that applies to lockers, curbside garbage 
bags, and heat patterns,21 the balancing test yields the same kind of result as any 
other precedential opinion that tells individuals how to direct their conduct in 
accordance with the law, how they may legitimately expect to be treated, and what 
would count as a legal violation. The result is to inform the public about their 
privacy rights in a clear and comprehensible fashion, and to provide guidance to 
the police, whose ability to do their job effectively depends on the availability of 
reliable bright-line rules.
But although the Court has emphasized that questions of privacy “must 
be framed in broad and neutral terms,”22 it has crafted jurisprudence that 
makes categorical answers difficult in some contexts. Some questions about the 
validity of a search are answered contingently, not categorically, and in these 
cases the balancing test is not very helpful in informing the public or in guiding 
the conduct of the police. This has been a persistent difficulty in the area of 
informational privacy—and remains so even after Marakah. To ask what privacy 
interest attaches to email or text messages, for instance, under the existing 
20. See R v Buhay, 2003 SCC 30 at paras 18-24, [2003] 1 SCR 631 [Buhay] (lockers); R v M(A), 
supra note 13 at paras 61-65 (backpacks); R v Fearon, 2014 SCC 77 at paras 51-58, [2014] 
3 SCR 621 [Fearon] (cell phones). Notice that in “reject[ing] the idea that s. 8 of the Charter 
categorically precludes any search of a cell phone seized incidental to a lawful arrest” (ibid 
at para 64), the Court was refusing to adopt a categorical exclusion from an exception to the 
warrant requirement, not refusing to make a categorical statement about the nature of the 
privacy interest in cell phones.
21. See supra note 6 and the accompanying text. See also Patrick, supra note 19 (garbage bags); 
R v Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 SCR 432 [Tessling] (heat patterns).
22. R v M(A), supra note 13 at para 70 quoting R v Wong, [1990] 3 SCR 36 at 50, 120 NR 
34 [Wong]. See also R v M(A), supra note 13 at paras 116, 120; Kang-Brown, supra note 
15 at para 138 quoting Wong, ibid at 50; R v Buhay, supra note 20 at para 19 quoting 
Wong, ibid at 50.
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jurisprudence, is to ask the wrong question: The multifactor balancing test yields 
answers that apply to particular examples rather than to the class as a whole. 
Asking what privacy interest someone has in a text message is like asking the same 
question about a conversation. It is difficult to answer as a general matter because 
a given conversation could fall anywhere along the spectrum of privacy interests, 
depending on factors such as who was present and where the conversation took 
place.23 For example, in the case that introduced the balancing test to this area of 
law—a case involving an unauthorized recording of a call placed from a public 
phone booth—the Court emphasized that the defendant had “shut[] the door 
behind him,” and this act turned the booth into a “temporarily private place.”24 
A door left open could yield a different result. The same considerations apply to 
text messages. Thus, in Marakah, the Court distinguished between messages that 
are shielded from others’ eyes and messages that are readily visible to others, i.e., 
between messages over which the sender retains “shared control” after delivery 
and those for which such control is lacking.25 As I will argue in Part III(C) below, 
a different rationale for protecting text messages—based on social norms—would 
yield a more clearly categorical solution.
Given that the contingent problems must be resolved after the fact, 
on a case-by-case basis, the predictive value of any particular legal decision for law 
enforcement officers, and for the public, is limited, because the ex post balancing 
analysis may apply differently in another case with slightly different features. 
A workable solution to this privacy question must be one that allows for a certain 
amount of reliable assessment ex ante—a solution that strives, provisionally, 
to offer categorical answers where practically possible, without altering the 
structure of a jurisprudential arrangement that provides for contingent answers 
23. Thus, although some courts have likened text messaging to conversations with the aim of 
showing why both should generally be viewed as highly private, the analogy merely restates 
the problem rather than resolving it. See e.g. Marakah, ONCA, supra note 3 at paras 
109, 111 (“[A] typical exchange of text messages … is essentially a modern version of a 
conversation and can contain as much private information as an oral conversation” [emphasis 
added]) (LaForme J, dissenting). Even if an electronic or oral exchange reveals private 
information, it may fail to attract a privacy interest because of the circumstances in which it 
took place. Hence, so long as that interest depends on “the totality of circumstances,” and 
those circumstances must be ascertained for any given example, the analogy does not have 
the categorical force seemingly attributed to it. Courts pursuing this analogy usually cite 
R v Telus Communications Co, 2013 SCC 16 at para 5, [2013] 2 SCR 3 (in which the Court 
noted that “[t]ext messaging is, in essence, an electronic conversation”); however, for the 
reasons just given, the analogy marks the beginning of an analysis, not the end of one.
24. Katz, supra note 13 at 517 (Harlan J, concurring).
25. See supra note 7 and the accompanying text.
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whenever appropriate. Consider phone booths again: To say that they are treated 
differently, depending on whether the door is open or closed, goes a long way 
towards the ex ante guidance that a categorical rule would offer. Not all questions 
of informational privacy can be resolved in this fashion, but there are some means 
of managing these problems in ways that tilt more towards the categorical.
To raise this point is not to suppose that the courts should prefer an approach 
that gives the police readier access to more information on a relatively low 
standard; a workable solution is one that tells the police clearly what is permitted 
and what is prohibited. A doctrine that serves to deprive the police of warrantless 
access to nearly all text messages—as Marakah aims to do—is a significant 
improvement over the prior jurisprudence, which evaluated the privacy interest 
in each message ex post. Providing guidance does not require that investigations 
must be as easy as possible; rather, it requires clarifying in advance, as much as 
possible, what the police may lawfully search and what is off limits. In what 
follows, I will suggest an approach that takes precisely this form: By adopting a 
requirement of reasonable suspicion as to certain objectively specifiable features 
of the text messages in question and the circumstances surrounding them, the 
courts would deprive the police of warrantless and groundless access to most 
text messages—including some that are open to warrantless scrutiny, under 
Marakah—while affording warrantless but justified access if the police can show 
that they have sufficient grounds to believe that the particular messages they seek 
to obtain were related to specific criminal activities. In these cases, the basis for 
the search, though insufficient for a warrant, is strong enough to ensure that 
the police are not using random fishing expeditions to acquire incriminating 
evidence. Before developing that approach, however, I will explain the currently 
applicable doctrine in more detail.
In an area where those who are guided by the law must often make quick 
decisions using limited information, clarity and predictability are particularly 
important. Their absence generates significant costs in terms of misdirected 
or needlessly duplicative police efforts, lost prosecution opportunities as well 
as ill-advised prosecutions, and risky and expensive information-gathering 
techniques that are adopted because of uncertainty about cheaper and safer 
alternatives. The framework proposed in this article is aimed at yielding clarity 
and predictability, without eliminating or reducing the basic privacy interest 
at issue. Categorical solutions also pose some danger because they operate so 
bluntly; however, they have the great virtue of applying in a “broad and neutral” 
fashion,26 allowing the police and citizens alike to tell how a privacy interest is 
26. See supra note 22 and the accompanying text.
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likely to attach. Contingent solutions are much more dangerous, because they 
can make rights opaque and uncertain. Perhaps there can be no perfect solution, 
but the one suggested in this article strives for a more categorical approach, 
capable of allowing a reasonable ex ante assessment of privacy rights.
II. SPACE, INFORMATION, AND PRIVACY
Although courts never tire of repeating the truism that constitutional limits on 
search and seizure “protec[t] people, not places,”27 many of the easy questions in 
this area are easy precisely because they involve places for which the applicable 
privacy interest can indeed be specified categorically.28 It is when the question 
relates not to places, but to information conveyed by one individual to another, 
that the emphasis on “people” becomes greater and the answers become harder. 
Consider the following examples involving places. Someone driving on the street 
or making a purchase at the drugstore is acting in public, and, because of the 
location, cannot invoke a constitutional privacy interest to keep law enforcement 
officers from observing this conduct.29 Someone at an airport or border crossing 
has a diminished privacy interest because of the location.30 Residences, backpacks, 
and lockers are all entitled to constitutional solicitude because the courts have 
regarded them as spaces of a certain type—intimate, sealed—such that the owner 
has a right against unauthorized intrusion. These cases are easily resolvable insofar 
as they address the privacy interest in a particular kind of space: When it is seen 
as a personal and enclosed alcove, it receives more privacy protection, and when 
it is seen as open and public, it receives less.
Analogously, when evaluating privacy protection for mobile phones, 
courts have often likened them to places. For a good while, courts afforded 
27. Hunter, supra note 14 at para 159 quoting Katz, supra note 13 at 351.
28. As Professor David Alan Sklansky notes, the US Supreme Court has continued to “read 
the Fourth Amendment to provide protections that are place-specific,” and this practice of 
“[t]ying reasonable expectations of privacy to special, constitutionally protected places has 
seemed to drain Katz of much of its significance.” See David Alan Sklansky, “‘One Train May 
Hide Another’: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure” (2007) 41:3 
UC Davis L Rev 875 at 884-85.
29. See e.g. R v Felger, 2014 BCCA 34 at paras 46, 52, 350 BCAC 53: “The ‘search’ occurred in a 
retail premises that was open to the public … there was no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the retail premises.”
30. See e.g. Kang-Brown, supra note 15 at para 45: “The security measures taken at airports have 
of necessity resulted in a diminished expectation of privacy in that setting.”
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them little protection if they were not “locked” (i.e., password-protected),31 
but more recently the Court has repudiated that conclusion while nevertheless 
preserving the analogy:
Like the private sphere of the home, our digital devices remain intensely personal, 
even when we do not take every possible precaution to protect them. An individual 
who leaves her front door unlocked does not forfeit her privacy interest in her home 
to the state; the same is true of her phone.32
The emphasis on “personal” details, which might seem to call attention to the 
subject matter rather than the location, quickly gives way to a spatial analogy. The 
recognition that spatial analogies support categorical answers may explain why 
the Court in Marakah held that the “place” of the search is a factor that supports 
the sender’s privacy interest, even while acknowledging that “an electronic 
conversation does not occupy a particular physical place,”33 and that when 
electronic messages and conversations are visible to others, the conceptual wall 
that creates a “zone of privacy” dissolves, and the sender’s privacy interest erodes.34
Other privacy problems, currently treated as categorical, might yet drift 
into the realm of the contingent, and these problems typically feature liminal 
spaces—usually spaces that border ambiguously on the domestic. Heat patterns 
emanating from a residence are, at present, treated as a fairly blunt information 
source, incapable of revealing specific and granular details about the activity 
inside a building. According to the Court, a forward-looking infrared camera 
(FLIR) can measure only the total quantum of electricity being consumed, and 
so cannot convey information about the inhabitants’ personal habits—at least 
not in a way that would reveal “biographical core” information.35 But that could 
change, for example, if the technology becomes capable of isolating the particular 
31. See e.g. R v Belcourt, 2012 BCSC 229 at para 32, [2013] BCWLD 3351: “[N]one of the 
items seized … including the cell phone [were] … locked, in such a way as to indicate that 
the owner or possessor maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in it”; R v Thompson, 
2013 ONSC 4624 at para 44, 113 WCB (2d) 741: “[A]s the cell phone was neither locked 
nor password protected, the police were at liberty to conduct a cursory search of the phone to 
ascertain if it contained evidence relevant to the alleged crime.”
32. R v Fearon, supra note 20 at para 160.
33. Marakah, supra note 1 at para 28.
34. Ibid at para 37.
35. Tessling, supra note 21 at para 62: “The information generated by FLIR imaging about the 
respondent does not touch on ‘a biographical core of personal information,’ nor does it 
‘ten[d] to reveal intimate details of [his] lifestyle’ … . It shows that some of the activities in 
the house generate heat.” Cf Kyllo v US, 533 US 27 (2001) at 38: “The Agema Thermovision 
210 might disclose … at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna 
and bath—a detail that many would consider ‘intimate.’”
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room where electricity is being used or the kind of device at work. Under such 
circumstances, the Court might revisit the question and conclude that each 
time the police wish to record that information, their request must be assessed 
individually—not as a generic instance of FLIR measurement, but as a particular 
intrusion whose legality requires an individuated balancing analysis.
Courts have also addressed the privacy interest in garbage bags by dwelling 
on spatial considerations, and here again, one may discern a certain kind of 
hesitation about the answer, because of the bags’ liminal location. The contents 
of a trash bag may, of course, reveal “biographical core” information, and yet 
the Court has treated the issue categorically, holding that when people leave 
garbage at the curb to be collected, they “intend[] to abandon [their] proprietary 
interest in the physical objects,” thereby rendering the contents open to police 
inspection without any need to articulate a justification for the search.36 The 
Court took some pains to rationalize its holding in spatial terms, explaining that 
only after “the garbage [has been] placed at or within reach of the lot line, [can] the 
householder … be said to have unequivocally abandoned it”37 By this logic, the 
differing privacy interests that would otherwise attach individually to each of the 
various contents within the bag are all effaced once it has been placed in a certain 
location. Although the Court analyzed the problem in spatial terms to generate 
a categorical answer, Justice Abella concurred separately, noting that garbage 
bags “may contain the most intensely personal and private information about 
ourselves,”38 and proposing that they should be “protect[ed] from indiscriminate 
state intrusion”—that is, the kind of groundless search that the police may 
conduct whenever a reasonable expectation of privacy is lacking.39 I will return 
to this point later; for the moment, it is sufficient to observe that these concerns 
do not arise when someone uses a public trash can. In those cases, there is no 
dispute that the act of discarding an item allows the police to seize it without any 
articulable cause, and no one has suggested that reasonable suspicion should be 
36. Patrick, supra note 19 at para 54; Compare the rejoinder of Justice Abella: “What we 
inelegantly call ‘garbage’ may contain … intensely personal and private information” 
(ibid at para 76).
37. Ibid at para 62 [emphasis added]. Contrast R v Roy, 2010 BCCA 448 at para 22, 295 
BCAC 191 (“[W]here a person is asked to consent to a search of the trash while it is still 
located within the home, the person is essentially being asked to consent to an otherwise 
unconstitutional search”).
38. Patrick, supra note 19 at para 76.
39. Ibid at para 77 [emphasis added].
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required.40 The disagreement, then, arises because of the liminal space around 
the home, not because of the inherent potential for garbage to include highly 
personal information.
Finally, some questions are answered contingently, because they do not relate 
to places. Credit card purchases, chat room exchanges, email—each of these, 
under the existing jurisprudence, might attract a greater or lesser privacy interest 
depending on the subject matter, the way the transaction is conducted, or the 
involvement of others. In R v Siemens, for example, the Provincial Court of 
Saskatchewan applied the multifactor balancing test to conclude that although 
the accused might have had a “subjective expectation of privacy” in a credit card 
transaction involving a car rental, the information it recorded did “not reveal 
intimate details of his lifestyle or his personal choices,”41 and consequently the 
court was “not satisfied … that the accused had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in [that] information.”42 Conversely, in R v Pheasant, the Ontario Court 
of Justice observed that individuals “have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their own banking and credit card records,” evidently because, when collected in 
the aggregate, such records could reveal “biographical core” details that a more 
carefully delimited search would not disclose.43 Again, in R v Kwok, the Ontario 
Court of Justice held that the claimant had no privacy interest in conversations 
taking place in “a chat room to which many people subscribed and spoke,” but 
did have a privacy interest once he “move[d] to [a] private chat room,” because 
that “change[d] the nature of the communication and ma[d]e it a private 
communication.”44 When questions of informational privacy are not answered 
40. See e.g. R v D(B), 2011 ONCA 51 at para 14, 273 OAC 241 (“I cannot see how B.D. 
could have any reasonable expectation of privacy in the documentation she left, discarded, 
in a store frequented by the general public”); R v Marini, 71 WCB (2d) 727, 2005 
CarswellOnt 9228 (WL Can) at paras 7, 17 (Sup Ct) (no expectation of privacy in ginger ale 
cans “seized from a recycling container in the public hallway” and “from a men’s washroom 
provided for use by the public”); R v Delaa, 2006 CarswellAlta 2466 (WL Can) at para 124, 
[2006] AJ No 948 (QL) (QB) (accused was “in a public parking lot of a service station, 
and [he] cavalierly disposed of the gum in a manner that could not have carried with it any 
expectation of privacy or secure disposal”).
41. R v Siemens, 2011 SKPC 57 at paras 29, 52, 374 Sask R 193 [Siemens].
42. Ibid at para 55. See also R v Okubadejo, [2008] OJ 4732 (QL) at para 22, 2008 CarswellOnt 
7039 (WL Can) (Sup Ct) (the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
particular record of a “credit card transaction … seized by police from a gas station” at para 
1); R v Stymiest, 2006 NBQB 160 at paras 23, 46, 304 NBR (2d) 200 (the accused had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the particular travel expense claims and credit card 
charges that the police had acquired on a warrantless basis).
43. R v Pheasant (2000), 48 WCB (2d) 75 at para 55, 2001 GTC 3427 (Ont Ct J) [Pheasant].
44. R v Kwok, 78 WCB (2d) 21, [2008] OJ 2414 at para 22 (Ct J).
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by reference to spatial considerations (as with the curbside garbage bags), the 
analysis tends to proceed through a careful examination of the challenged records 
or documents, involving the particular features of each.
Notice that these cases could be resolved categorically: For instance, 
in Siemens the court might have ruled (as Pheasant did) that because of general 
capacity for credit card records to reveal highly personal details, they are 
categorically protected, and it made no difference that the particular record in 
question conveyed no intimate information. Marakah, as we have seen, proposes 
a categorical solution to the treatment of text messages, but in so doing, draws 
on factors that could yield “different result[s]” depending on the circumstances.45
To sum up, in virtually every case involving privacy in a place or thing 
(backpacks, cell phones, garbage left at the curb), the analysis has, in effect, been 
conducted ex ante by means of a legal decision that addresses that category. Even 
when a later court (evaluating the validity of a warrantless backpack search, for 
example) makes a point of applying the balancing test, comparing the case at hand 
to the precedential one, the procedure is essentially mechanical, simply designed 
to reiterate and confirm the logic of the controlling precedent, not to find out 
whether it can be replicated (as with repetitions of scientific experiments).46 That 
courts were content, for so long, to resolve disputes in this area of the law by 
attending to places rather than people, suggests that the privacy problems flowing 
from mobile information remained comparatively inconspicuous for most of the 
twentieth century, making a spatial and categorical solution plausible. Indeed, 
Katz v United States, the decision that sponsored the turn away from places and 
towards people as the objects of legal protection, was also the case that produced 
the “totality of the circumstances” test as a byproduct.47 Just as privacy questions 
that have mainly to do with protected spaces are usually answered categorically, 
those that are not readily understood in spatial terms are often taken to require 
the more thoroughgoing and individuated analysis that Katz introduced. Let 
us turn, then, to the most frequently invoked versions of the balancing test in 
Canadian jurisprudence.
45. See note 5 and accompanying text above.
46. For a valuable comparison between these two methods of repetition and evaluation, see Mary 
M Kennedy, “Generalizing from Single Case Studies” (1979) 3:4 Evaluation Q 661.
47. Katz, supra note 13.
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III. TWO PRIVACY FRAMEWORKS
Canadian courts have fashioned various tests for evaluating the privacy interests 
that may protect individuals from an unauthorized search; two of the most 
prominent were set out in R v Edwards and R v Plant48 (I put aside the version 
sometimes attributed to R v Tessling and sometimes to R v Spencer, which 
redescribes the Edwards test at a greater level of abstraction).49 The version in 
Edwards functions generically, with an implicit assumption that the typical 
dispute involves a contestation over the privacy interest in a place or physical 
object, while the version in Plant focuses particularly on informational privacy. 
Thus, if a new question arises as to the privacy interest in a certain kind of 
space, the analysis should proceed under Edwards (or perhaps Spencer, or both) 
whereas if such a question arises as to informational privacy, the analysis should 
also proceed under Plant. The availability of several different tests, however, has 
created some inconsistency in the law: Courts have used nearly every possible 
combination of the three tests (using one, two, and rarely all three of the above) 
in the checkerboard array of cases confronting questions of informational privacy.
A. EDWARDS AND PLANT
Edwards set out a seven-factor test for assessing the “totality of the circumstances” 
bearing on a claimant’s privacy interest, though the Court hastened to add that 
the list was not exhaustive. Those factors include:
(i) presence [of the accused] at the time of the search; (ii) possession or control of 
the property or place searched; (iii) ownership of the property or place; (iv) historical 
use of the property or item; (v) the ability to regulate access, including the right to 
admit or exclude others from the place; (vi) the existence of a subjective expectation 
of privacy; and (vii) the objective reasonableness of the expectation.50
In passing, it may be worth commenting on the origins of this formula, which 
Edwards attributed to United States v Gomez.51 Gomez was concerned with a 
claimant’s standing to assert “a reasonable expectation of privacy in … [an] area 
48. R v Edwards, [1996] 1 SCR 128, 132 DLR (4th) 31 [Edwards]; Plant, supra note 14.
49. R v Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, [2014] 2 SCR 212 [Spencer].
50. Edwards, supra note 48 at para 45. Spencer condenses these factors into four headings, which 
might be regarded as an improvement, but carries the risk of presenting the analysis at a 
level of abstraction that obscures the relevant considerations, and necessitates recourse to 
Edwards (or another test) for more specific guidance about their meaning. See Spencer, supra 
note 49 at para 18.
51. United States v Gomez, 16 F (3d) 254 (8th Cir 1994) [Gomez].
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searched”—that is to say, in a place—and said nothing about the presence of the 
claimant.52 It is unclear how “presence” entered the Edwards test; however, it will 
be evident that whenever there is a question as to privacy in mobile information 
as such (rather than in the device holding that information), the factors involving 
physical considerations have little significance.
In the case of an email, chat-room record, or text message retrieved from 
a source that does not belong to the claimant, questions of physical custody, 
ownership, and historical use of the text or record (or device holding that 
information) can do no work in enhancing the claimant’s privacy interest and 
will generally be irrelevant. In consequence, the questions of regulating access 
and objectively reasonable expectations of privacy remain as the pertinent 
considerations. “Presence” may be significant when the police are searching an 
item or a place in which a claimant could assert ownership (such as a residence, 
car, locker, or suitcase), and when the police are searching a physical space that 
the claimant is occupying (e.g., a stall in a public washroom or in someone 
else’s residence).53 When the police are extracting information from a phone, 
computer, or similar device in the hands of a third party, the claimant is usually 
absent, and the search would not be more invasive if the claimant were present. 
In such a case, the third and fourth Edwards factors (ownership and historical 
use of the property) must also be excluded: The device storing the information 
is not the property of the accused, nor is the information itself (in the relevant 
sense of “property”), and the historical use of the device and of the information 
can have no bearing on the privacy of the claimant (assuming that the “historical 
use” factor even applies here).
In the case of mobile information, the second Edwards factor (“control of 
the property”) amounts to much the same thing as the sixth factor (“the ability 
to regulate access”). Arguably, “control of the property” applies better to physical 
property, for which ownership is readily associated with control, whereas “the 
ability to regulate access” applies better to information, because its intangible 
nature makes access the more salient question, but a resort to either would 
ultimately emphasize that when the police obtain mobile information from 
the recipient, the sender has usually sacrificed some control or regulation over 
access. The question, then, is what difference that should make in the analysis, 
and on this point, the courts have diverged significantly. Some courts—including 
the Court of Appeal for Ontario, in the decision that Marakah reversed—have 
reasoned that sending a message necessarily entails giving up control over 
52. Ibid at 256.
53. On the last point, see Sklansky, supra note 28.
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it, and thereby losing any privacy interest, while others have repudiated that 
conclusion.54 In Part III(C) below, I will show why the “loss of control” argument 
establishes very little. Here, it is sufficient to observe that the control/access parts 
of the test have done much of the work when courts have turned to Edwards to 
resolve questions about mobile information. The only remaining consideration is 
the inquiry into “objective reasonableness”—a vexed question that bedevils every 
privacy case, and that has also produced a significant amount of disagreement 
among the courts, including disagreement as to what grounds this question 
should encompass. I take up this question below, in Part IV(A).
Turning from Edwards to Plant, we see that the latter is less apt to provide 
categorical answers. In focusing on informational privacy, Plant poses a series 
of questions that can sometimes, but not always, be answered before the police 
conduct a search. Plant mentions five factors:
[1] the nature of the information itself, [2] the nature of the relationship between 
the party releasing the information and the party claiming its confidentiality, [3] the 
place where the information was obtained, [4] the manner in which it was obtained 
and [5] the seriousness of the crime being investigated.55
The Court did not apply this test in Marakah, even though Plant is specifically 
directed at questions of informational privacy, and Edwards is not. From 
one perspective, that choice makes good sense, because the Plant test would 
significantly complicate the analysis, as the following paragraphs show. On the 
other hand, if Plant does not apply here, then its use in evaluating questions of 
information privacy more generally would also seem to be open to question. 
Numerous decisions relating to informational privacy have drawn on the Plant 
test, and if the Court now regards it as inapposite, it would have been helpful to 
say so directly.
Again, it bears repeating that when a search yields email, text messages, and 
the like, the significance of a given factor may not be readily evident, because 
the relevant details may not be available before or during the search. The “nature 
of the information” bears on a claimant’s privacy most acutely when the search 
yields “biographical core” information.56 What counts as personal and revealing 
is sometimes a matter of interpretation. Consequently, a search that may 
have appeared legitimate when it was underway could eventually prove to be 
54. See note 7 and accompanying text above. The Marakah majority did not rebut this view, but 
instead reasoned that the sender may sometimes have “shared control” with the recipient. See 
Marakah, supra note 1.
55. Plant, supra note 14 at 293 [numbering added].
56. Ibid.
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impermissible, on grounds that offer the police no basis for deciding whether or 
not to conduct a similar search in the future.
The second factor in Plant, the “nature of the [parties’] relationship,” matters 
particularly when it is a confidential relationship, and again, the police may be 
incapable of knowing this in advance—and may be unable to tell even after they 
have acquired the information. Not all communications will necessarily indicate 
the nature of the relationship between sender and recipient. Evidence on this 
point may take some time to emerge. Thus, this factor too has limited predictive 
value for determining the legitimacy of other, apparently similar, searches.
The question of “where the information was obtained” returns us to the spatial 
considerations discussed in Part II, above . For example, when the information is 
obtained, without legal authorization, from a claimant’s own residence or mobile 
device, this feature alone will tend to jeopardize the results of the search. The 
last two factors of the Plant test need not detain us for long. As to the “manner 
of the search,” in the cases that concern us here, there is neither a warrant nor 
a valid exception to the warrant requirement, but let us assume that there is 
reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspects are co-conspirators, and that the 
police conduct a limited search aimed only at disclosing information relating to 
the conspiracy. Whether that reasonable suspicion can amount to legal authority 
is precisely the question I will address in Part IV. As for the “seriousness of the 
crime,” let us assume provisionally that the crime in question is very serious, and 
we can modulate that assumption as needed when refining the analysis.
B. MOBILE INFORMATION AND BALANCING
At the outset, I offered a few short examples to show how contingent privacy 
questions may receive different answers depending on the circumstances,57 but 
it will help to provide some more illustrations, and particularly to show more 
concretely how the answers may depend on considerations that are unavailable 
to the police at the time of the search. In some of the cases involving electronic 
communications and privacy, courts have resolved the issue categorically, and 
have ruled that the claimant had a strong privacy interest because the emails and 
other messages were collected en masse during a sweeping search of the claimant’s 
computer. In these cases, courts have included email and various kinds of online 
messages in the blend of materials that revealed “biographical core” information 
about the claimant;58 however, this has not been taken to mean that email 
inevitably attracts a strong privacy interest. When courts have been asked more 
57. See text accompanying notes 36-40 above.
58. See e.g. R v Cole, 2012 SCC 53, [2012] 3 SCR 34.
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specifically about the privacy interest in a particular set of emails or messages, 
acquired through a focused search, the answers have varied.
Thus, for example, in R v Lowrey, the accused was charged with “child 
luring,” and the prosecution’s case included a series of Facebook messages between 
the accused and a fourteen-year-old girl.59 The court offered various reasons for 
allowing the messages into evidence; one reason was that “there is no proof that 
the impugned messages expose highly revealing information about [the claimant]. 
At least on the evidence before me, one gains no glimpse into the biographical core 
of information personal to Lowrey by reading the contents of [the messages].”60 
As this explanation shows, the court undertook to scrutinize the messages, 
and the analysis turned on details that the police could not have ascertained in 
advance of the search. It was perhaps only by chance that the messages were not 
so revealing as to make the court view the matter differently. Indeed, the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal took the opposite view in R v Craig, another “child 
luring” case involving internet messages, this time on Nexopia, “a social media 
website used primarily by teenagers.”61 The court observed that the claimant’s 
messages were “personal … [and] they exposed highly intimate details of [his] 
lifestyle and personal choices. In his discussions … he is flirtatious, discloses 
aspects of his sexuality, sexual history, drug use, and arranges to provide liquor 
to underage persons.”62 The court therefore ruled that the claimant’s “expectation 
of privacy in the messages seized by the police was objectively reasonable.”63 The 
precise content of the messages, then, may play a significant role in determining 
whether the search was permissible.
59. R v Lowrey, 2016 ABPC 131, 357 CRR (2d) 76 [Lowrey].
60. Ibid at para 67.
61. R v Craig, 2016 BCCA 154 at para 3, 385 BCAC 229 [Craig].
62. Ibid at para 139.
63. Ibid at para 142. Ultimately, the court ruled that despite the privacy violation, the messages 
were admissible under section 24(2) (ibid at para 197). For other examples of cases in which 
evidence was excluded because various items, when examined individually, turned out to 
reveal “biographical core” information, see e.g. R v Berry, 2013 BCSC 307 at para 60, 111 
WCB (2d) 821 (“The camera may not have contained Mr. Berry’s biographical data as 
such, but it contained video-recordings showing him in private situations or activities”); 
R v Grandison, 2016 BCSC 1712 at para 93, 342 CCC (3d) 249 (“The content of text 
messages may be perfunctory and routine or it might consist of very sensitive personal 
information. … [In this case,] [t]he content of the information gathered … reveals ‘core 
biographical information’ about the accused”). Compare R v O(T), 2010 ONCJ 334, 
90 WCB (2d) 17: “[T]he seized videos and photographs were of a highly personal nature, 
revealing details of the Applicant’s lifestyle” (ibid at para 34), but on balance, analysis under s 
24(2) counseled in favour of admitting the evidence (ibid at para 64).
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The Lowrey court also considered another factor involving information that 
is typically unavailable to the police at the time of the search:
Lowrey does not appear to have taken many practical steps to ensure that no one 
could view the contents of his Facebook account and, in particular, the content of 
text messages. He would leave his Facebook account “open” and accessible on his 
unlocked cell phone, wherever that happened to be from time-to-time.64
A court might be satisfied that so long as the claimant had left the account open, 
and the phone unlocked, at the moment when the police were conducting the 
search, that would be sufficient to answer this question; however, it can hardly 
be coincidental that Lowrey dwelt on the claimant’s usual practice, apparently 
over an extended period of time, rather than simply considering the details that 
the police could observe at the time of the search. Often, the police will have no 
access to that kind of information until the court does—which is to say, long 
after the impugned search. Consequently, if the claimant’s typical behaviour is 
a significant factor in assessing the privacy interest, the question can rarely be 
answered until the case comes to a hearing.
The court took a similar view in R v Beairsto, ruling that the claimant’s text 
messages were admissible because, among other factors, he had done nothing 
to ensure that his confederates would guarantee the privacy of his text messages 
after their receipt. One of the claimant’s associates was arrested, and his phone, 
seized during the arrest, was “open to a … chat” that was “indicative of drug 
trafficking.”65 This led the police to Beairsto, who was ultimately convicted of 
trafficking in cocaine. This conviction was possible, in part, because he lacked a 
privacy interest in the text messages, but the important point here is that the police 
had no means of telling, in advance, whether he had tried to protect the privacy 
of his messages, and indeed the police often have no basis for answering that 
question at the investigative stage. To premise the admissibility of the evidence on 
that inquiry, then, is effectively to prevent the police from determining whether 
the search is legally permissible. In Beairsto, the court focused in particular on 
what the claimant knew about the security practices of his associates (very little, 
as it turned out). Doubtless, the court noted, “a drug dealer would … hope that 
his text messages concerning drug dealings would be kept in confidence by the 
recipient,” but there was no evidence that Beairsto had ever met either of the 
recipients in person, or had “had any knowledge of [their] habits, associates or 
environment.” He had no basis for thinking that the recipients would protect 
64. Lowrey, supra note 59 at para 69.
65. R v Beairsto, 2016 ABQB 216 at para 11, 37 Alta LR (6th) 379.
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“the confidentiality and security of [his] text communications,” or that they 
would keep “others [from] hav[ing] access to his messages.”66 He lacked “any 
assurances of privacy or confidentiality,” but he “[n]evertheless … chose to use a 
… means of communicating” that was not “secure.”67 Different answers to these 
questions—involving details that could only come out while the case was being 
litigated—might have led the court to find a privacy interest, and to rule that the 
search was impermissible.
One might think that none of these considerations has any continuing 
significance for the treatment of text messages, because Marakah did not take them 
into account, and thus it implicitly overrules any analysis that draws on them. 
However, as we have seen, the Court’s reasoning relies more heavily on contingent 
factors than may at first appear, making it hard to predict whether lower courts 
will simply ignore Plant in future cases involving electronic communications. 
Moreover, where a privacy interest turns on the general tendency of a certain 
medium to reveal “biographical core” information, courts may be persuaded that 
if the evidence in contention did not actually reveal such information, the privacy 
interest was impaired only minimally, and hence, in spite of the Charter breach, 
the evidence is admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter. That is how the 
court proceeded, for instance, in R v Jarvis.68 The accused, a high school teacher, 
was charged with criminal voyeurism because he had used a pen camera to make 
surreptitious video images of female students during gym class. The Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice ruled that he had a privacy interest in the pen camera 
because the kind of information such a device contains “may relate to aspects 
of life that are deeply personal.”69 In the event at issue, however, it turned out 
66. Ibid at para 46.
67. Ibid.
68. 2014 ONSC 1801, 113 WCB (2d) 740 [Jarvis (2014)]. The accused was acquitted at trial 
(see R v Jarvis, 2015 ONSC 6813, 25 CR (7th) 330) and the acquittal was affirmed on 
appeal by a split bench (see R v Jarvis, 2017 ONCA 778, 41 CR (7th) 36). The case is now 
on appeal as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada (Docket No 37833, notice of appeal 
filed 8 November 2017). The issues in dispute, however, relate to the substantive grounds for 
determining whether the accused was guilty of voyeurism, as defined in the Criminal Code, 
not the admissibility of the video recordings.
69. Jarvis (2014), supra note 68 at para 57 quoting Buhay, supra note 20 at para 24.
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that his device “did not contain any personal biographical data.”70 Consequently 
the police had not seriously infringed on his privacy rights, and the recordings 
were admissible in court. So long as generally private types of information may 
be admissible just if the particular examples turn out to rate low on the Plant or 
Edwards test, all of the potentially relevant factors from those decisions come 
back into play—as a means of ruling on the strength, rather than the existence of 
a privacy interest, and therefore on the admissibility of the evidence. Practically 
speaking, it makes little difference at which stage of the analysis these factors 
come into play, because so long as they operate in this fashion, the basic question 
about how they bear on the legitimacy of a given search, from an ex ante point of 
view, remains the same.
As we have seen, the first two factors of the Plant test can make it difficult 
for police to tell whether they may legitimately undertake a particular search. 
If we reflect more generally on the results in Lowrey and Beairsto, however, they 
can suggest an approach that would help the police to decide whether or not 
to proceed. In most cases involving conspiracies to sell drugs, firearms, and 
similar contraband, there is good reason to doubt that the communications 
among the conspirators would include “biographical core” information. Again, 
even if the conspirators took some pains to assure each other that they would 
protect the confidentiality of their communications, that can hardly be a reason 
for the courts to ascribe a heightened privacy interest to the messages. If the 
police can show objectively that they have reasonable suspicion to believe that 
the claimants were conspiring in this fashion, they should be allowed to presume 
that the claimants had only a basic privacy interest in their communications, and 
on that basis, the police should be entitled to obtain the relevant text messages 
(and only those messages). Where that reasonable suspicion is well supported, 
70. Jarvis (2014), supra note 68 at para 93. For similar examples, see e.g. R v Moldovan, 85 WCB 
(2d) 203, [2009] OJ No 4442 (QL) at paras 177-78 (Sup Ct) (impact of Charter breach 
was minimal, even though police lacked authorization to intercept phone conversation, 
because “the state did not intercept anything of a personal nature … On the contrary, 
as it happens, the police intercepted only conversations in which the very criminality they 
were investigating was being discussed” at para 177); R v Robertson, 2017 BCSC 965 at 
paras 78-79, [2017] BCWLD 3946 (impact of Charter breach was “minor,” even though 
police “fail[ed] to properly execute the entry pursuant to the knock and announce rule,” 
because, among other reasons, it turned out that the items seized were “not particularly 
personal or private”); R v Clarke, 2016 ONSC 351 at paras 135-36, 129 WCB (2d) 377 
(impact of Charter breach was “not … on the more serious end of the spectrum,” even 
though bank records were acquired pursuant to deficient production order, because although 
“[b]ank records contain personal financial information,” the material seized did not reveal 
information about “the most private domains” of the accused’s life).
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any invasion of a privacy interest is minimal, as in Jarvis. Moreover, given that 
Plant refers to the seriousness of the crime as well as the other considerations 
discussed here, the gravity of an offence such as conspiring to sell firearms might 
even be sufficient to overcome some factors that would enhance the privacy of 
one’s communications. In that case, even when the conspirators have disclosed 
biographically significant details or are siblings in a “crime family” jointly engaged 
in a conspiracy, these considerations may be insufficient to render the fruits of the 
search inadmissible. By ruling on this point, a court could further enhance the 
predictability of the analysis, educating the police and public more clearly as to 
how these considerations will bear on the legitimacy of a search.
C. THE ARGUMENT FROM CONTROL
We have seen that when courts refer to Plant, the analysis tends to be individuated, 
and the predictive value of any given decision is limited. However, some courts 
have given little heed to Plant, drawing primarily on Edwards and therefore 
reaching categorical conclusions. The Court sought to take this approach in 
Marakah, with limited success. With respect to text messages, a significant part 
of the debate has turned on the fifth Edwards factor—“the ability to regulate 
access.” This consideration played a significant role in the lower court judgment 
that Marakah reversed, and also in the reasons of the dissenting opinion of the 
Court in Marakah. That logic also informs the dissent in R v Pelucco, a judgment 
by the British Columbia Court of Appeal addressing the same problem.71 The 
analyses in all three decisions are worth considering, because the majority in 
Marakah did not rebut this argument, leaving the impression that it still has 
some persuasive force if the prosecution can demonstrate that the accused lost 
control over the text messages. As I will show, this argument cannot withstand 
close scrutiny.
The Marakah dissent offers what is perhaps a more elliptical version of 
the “loss of control” argument than some other courts have furnished. Justice 
Moldaver, in his dissent, explains that “a reasonable expectation of personal 
privacy requires some measure of control over the subject matter of the search,”72 
and that “[c]ontrol distinguishes a personal desire for privacy from a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”73 Citing Duarte’s definition of privacy as “the right of 
… individual[s] to determine for [themselves] when, how, and to what extent 
[they] will release personal information,” Justice Moldaver reasons that once a 
71. Pelucco, supra note 11.
72. Marakah, supra note 1 at para 113 (Moldaver J, dissenting).
73. Ibid at para 119 [emphasis in original].
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person loses control over some piece of information, it “change[s] from private 
to public in nature.”74 The recipient, he observes, has “complete autonomy” over 
the information,75 except when, by statute or at common law, the recipient has 
“a qualified obligation … to maintain confidentiality over personal information 
[which] provides a measure of constructive control which can support a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”76 On this view, the inability to regulate access and the 
condition of being public are so closely linked that little more need be said about 
why the former entails the latter. The analysis turns only briefly to the results 
that follow from lack of control: “The risk that a recipient may repeat what was 
said during a conversation, or share his or her record of the conversation with 
others, is a risk that individuals must reasonably assume, and thus may defeat a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.”77 On this view, whatever cannot be controlled 
is subject to a risk of being shared, and the very possibility of that risk is the 
feature that changes the nature of the information.
Marakah reversed a judgment by a split bench of the Court of Appeal for 
Ontario, and in examining the relation between privacy and control, the majority 
on that court relied heavily on the Pelucco dissent. Indeed, in elaborating its 
reasoning, the court quoted approvingly, and at length, from the Pelucco dissent:
[W]here a … message reaches its intended recipient, the autonomy interest 
underlying our s. 8 understanding of privacy is fully realized (see e.g., Hunter v. 
Southam at 159, R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 at 293, and Tessling at para. 63).
A person who—without any guarantee of confidentiality or indication from the 
recipient that the message will be kept confidential—communicates information 
has made an autonomous choice (i.e., determined for himself or herself ) [to] 
who[m], how and to what extent to communicate information to the fullest extent 
possible. Any further claim against a recipient is a claim that the sender can then 
determine [to] who[m], how and to what extent the recipient will communicate 
information to further third parties, which interferes with the recipient’s notional 
sphere of personal autonomy.78
74. Ibid at para 125 citing R v Duarte, [1990] 1 SCR 30 at 46, 65 DLR (4th) 240 [Duarte].
75. Marakah, supra note 1 at paras 99, 145.
76. Ibid at para 141. This includes, but is not limited to, a relationship with “a lawyer, 
doctor, psychiatrist or another professional who owes a duty of confidentiality or trust 
to the claimant,” or a regulated entity that is subject to statutory privacy protection 
(ibid at para 137).
77. Ibid at para 129.
78. Marakah, ONCA, supra note 3 at para 78 quoting Pelucco, supra note 11 at paras 115, 118 
(Goepel JA dissenting).
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It is usually wise, when encountering block quotations of this length, to skip 
over them and proceed to the text, but I urge the reader to review the quoted 
language, because it furnishes the fullest justification yet offered in Canadian 
jurisprudence as a principled rationale for the termination of the sender’s privacy 
interest on receipt of the message, and as will become evident, the justification 
rapidly crumbles upon scrutiny.
First, the “loss of control” argument control proves too much. If the inability 
to control the recipient was sufficient by itself to terminate the sender’s privacy 
interest, it would follow that no one has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in a letter or an email, once it has been delivered, and hence that all forms of 
written correspondence, as a general matter, are freely available to the police on a 
warrantless basis—because where there is no privacy interest, the police have no 
need to articulate any justification for search or seizure. Analogously, if someone 
had a phone that automatically recorded each incoming call, the recording would 
also be freely available to the police, and could be used in evidence against the 
caller, even if the police acquired it without any justification. This view finds no 
support in Canadian jurisprudence. When courts have considered the privacy 
interest attaching to letters, the question has usually involved correspondence 
sent by prison inmates, whose privacy interests are diminished to such a point 
that their letters may be intercepted in transit.79
The Pelucco dissent cited US jurisprudence to indicate that US courts have 
indeed taken this view, speaking of the “American rationale that a letter’s author 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy [after it has been delivered].”80 
But US courts do not routinely admit letters obtained during police searches that 
were conducted without either a warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement. Although a number of US courts have asserted this view, in nearly 
every instance the police acquired the letter either by means of a lawful search 
or from a third party who voluntarily turned the letter over to law enforcement 
79. See e.g. R v Ballantyne, 2008 BCSC 1566 at paras 32, 88, [2009] BCWLD 5161 (“Various 
cases deal with the effect that prisoners in correctional institutions, whether they be on 
remand or serving a sentence, have a greatly reduced objective expectation of privacy,” 
holding that “Mr. Ballantyne had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the correspondence 
he mailed from the Winnipeg Remand Centre” at paras 32, 88); R v Stevens, 2001 ABQB 
340 at paras 35-36, 291 AR 40: “[T]he [two] accused … knew that their letters were being 
screened or knew there was a substantial and serious risk that the letters were being screened” 
(ibid at para 35). As such, “there existed no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to 
the correspondence between [the two accused]” (ibid at para 36).
80. Pelucco, supra note 11 at para 112 (Goepel JA dissenting) citing Ray v United States, 658 
F (2d) 608 at 610 (8th Cir 1981) [Ray], United States v Hubbard, 493 F Supp 209 (DDC 
1979) [Hubbard]. See also supra note 81.
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officials.81 These settings do not involve an unauthorized search. Once we set 
those cases aside, not even a handful of cases remain—and their facts are so 
ambiguous that they offer only weak support for the conclusion being urged.82 
The “loss of control” argument, according to the very terms in which the Marakah 
and Pelucco dissents explain it, would eliminate the privacy interest in most forms 
of written communication. The existing Canadian and US jurisprudence does 
not warrant such an extreme view.
Second, the Pelucco dissent strives unpersuasively to explain its position 
by appealing to the sender’s “autonomy interest,” which is asserted to be “fully 
realized” on the letter’s receipt, such that any further constraint would “interfer[e] 
81. In those instances, the third parties were individuals, not entities such as banks or internet 
service providers. For example, in United States v King, 55 F (3d) 1193 (6th Cir 1995), the 
letters came to light because the recipient “asked [the FBI agent investing the case] to remove 
some items from her apartment” (ibid at 1195), and these included “[a] suitcase containing 
fifty-one letters” from the defendant to the recipient (ibid at 1194).
82. According to the leading American treatise on the law of search and seizure by Wayne R 
LaFave, “[t]he standing of the sender … terminates once delivery of the goods has been 
made.” LaFave cites nine cases to support this view, many of which expressly assert this very 
proposition; however, in eight of the nine cases, a third party turned the letter over to the 
police, or the letter was the subject of a valid search warrant, or was in plain view during 
a validly executed search, or was obtained during a search pursuant to arrest. Wayne R 
LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 5th ed, §11.3(f ) (2016). 
In the ninth case, State v Kenny, 224 Neb 638 (1987) [Kenny], the Nebraska Supreme Court 
upheld a conviction that depended, in part, on the prosecution’s use of a letter written by 
the defendant and obtained through a search that was not supported by probable cause 
or any exception to the probable cause requirement (although the facts suggest that the 
search may have been supported by reasonable suspicion). Even assuming that there was no 
articulable basis at all for the search in Kenny, this forty-year old decision by a state court can 
hardly be considered sufficient, by itself, to establish the point in question. One may suspect 
that the leading treatise in this area would have included more cases not only asserting the 
proposition, but also applying it, if they were available to be found. The two US authorities 
cited in the Pelucco dissent (see Pelucco, supra note 11 at para 112 citing Hubbard, supra note 
80, and Ray, supra note 80) also offer little support. In Hubbard, the court observed that 
the letters in question had been made “available to numerous third parties” (Hubbard, supra 
note 80 at 214). Where the recipient has actually shared the information with “numerous” 
others, one need not speculate about how the privacy interest could terminate; by her 
own actions, the recipient has in fact terminated it by making the information public. 
Ray offers no independent analysis of the privacy issue, and instead depends entirely on 
Hubbard. Moreover, Ray frames the inquiry in terms of standing, rather than inquiring 
into the defendant’s privacy interest in the letters that the search disclosed: the court was 
content simply to observe that the defendant “lacks standing to contest the alleged search 
of [a third party’s] hotel room” (Ray, supra note 80 at 611). In neither case, then, did the 
mere supposition of what the recipient might do explain why the sender had no privacy 
interest in a letter.
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with the recipient’s notional sphere of personal autonomy.”83 This argument 
appears fleetingly in the Marakah dissent, when Justice Moldaver  refers to the 
recipient’s “autonomy,” which, by implication, comes to the fore just when 
the sender’s autonomy terminates.84 For this proposition, Pelucco cites Hunter, 
Plant, and Tessling,85 but those cases provide no help; in fact, they undermine 
the contention. Hunter, in the relevant passage, does not use the term autonomy, 
but does speak of the “right of privacy, which is the right to be secure against 
encroachment against the citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy in a free and 
democratic society.”86 The relevant passage in Plant speaks of “the underlying 
values of dignity, integrity, and autonomy”—values which the Charter recognizes 
by “protect[ing] a biographical core of personal information which individuals 
in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from 
dissemination by the state.”87 Tessling, in the cited paragraph, states that a heat 
pattern emanating from a residence “offers no insight into [the residents’] private 
life, and reveals nothing of [their] ‘biographical core of personal information.’ 
Its disclosure scarcely affects the ‘dignity, integrity and autonomy’ of the person 
whose house is subject of the FLIR image.”88
As these quotations show, the case law speaks not of autonomy alone, but 
of dignity and integrity as well. Moreover, the proposition about the expiry of 
the autonomy interest is simply Pelucco’s interpretation, unsupported by any 
language in the three cited cases. The dissents in Pelucco and Marakah gloss over 
the question of whether one’s interests in dignity and integrity also expire on 
receipt of the message, and it cannot go without saying that these interests would 
vanish so readily; if anything, the latter are more enduring than autonomy in 
these circumstances. Even if we focus solely on autonomy, however, it is hard to 
see how that interest can be said to “disappear” once a message has been delivered. 
Again, it must be emphasized that we are discussing the right of individuals “to be 
secure against encroachment … in a free and democratic society,” and the right 
of individuals, in such a society, to protect information “from dissemination by 
the state.” The question of whether the recipient may share a message, in such a 
society, should not be readily and casually conflated with the question of how 
83. Marakah, ONCA, supra note 3 at para 78 quoting Pelucco, supra note 11 at para 118 (Goepel 
JA dissenting). One may wish to stress the word notional, because it reveals one of the 
weakest aspects of this analysis.
84. See supra note 74.
85. See note 78 and the accompanying text above.
86. Hunter, supra note 14 at 159.
87. Plant, supra note 14 at 293.
88. Tessling, supra note 21 at para 63.
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that potential result bears on what the state may legitimately do, particularly if 
the recipient has not in fact done anything, but suffers only a “notional” harm to 
a theoretically postulated “sphere of personal autonomy” in a thought experiment 
about the use of the message.
Consider a society in which text messages (to say nothing of emails and 
letters) are open to police surveillance, which is achieved by collecting them from 
the recipient, so that any given text message is subject to “dissemination by the 
state,” as Plant put it. Can anyone doubt that this practice would significantly 
undermine people’s autonomy, and that people would hesitate before sending 
any message, because of their uncertainty about its ultimate destination and 
use? The most basic conception of “privacy in a free and democratic society” 
has to assume that communications are not presumptively available to the 
police without any articulable justification, yet this is what the “loss of control” 
argument seeks to prove.
As noted at the outset, when a reasonable expectation of privacy is lacking, 
the police may search on a warrantless and groundless basis. The sender’s lack 
of control may be a relevant consideration in evaluating the privacy interest 
in written communications, but to make it determinative would undermine 
precisely the values that Hunter, Plant, and Tessling (among other decisions) seek 
to advance by limiting the government’s powers of search and seizure. One need 
only consider the question briefly to see that all of the interests at stake in the 
privacy jurisprudence, including autonomy, would be significantly compromised 
under the “loss of control” theory.
D. THE CONTROL THEORY AND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
How did the confusion at the heart of the “loss of control” theory arise? Reduced 
to its basic form, the theory assumes that because the recipient may share a 
message with anyone else, the sender’s autonomy interest necessarily expires where 
the recipient’s interest begins, and so the police are entitled to have access to the 
message without having to specify any articulable grounds. Yet one of the most 
fundamental principles of the law of search and seizure—and of constitutional 
law generally—is that restrictions on state power do not apply to private 
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individuals.89 Individuals may engage in all kinds of conduct that is forbidden 
to the state. It seems odd, then, to conclude that an individual’s ability to 
disseminate someone else’s message (or email, or letter) automatically entitles the 
state to do the same thing. The conclusion does not seem so odd, however, once 
we realize that, in the law of search and seizure, the “public exposure” doctrine 
and its cognates have blurred part of the distinction between individual and 
state action. Items exposed to public view (e.g., atop a dashboard, visible in an 
unzipped backpack on the subway, posted on a freely available electronic bulletin 
board) are treated as open to the public and therefore open to police inspection.90 
Precisely because any random member of the public might happen to see it, 
the police may also view it without having to articulate any basis for looking at 
it—without reasonable and probable grounds or reasonable suspicion. It matters 
not whether anyone except the police officer has seen it, so long as it is publicly 
observable. By extension, the same logic applies to records of public transactions. 
For instance, if the owner of a convenience store videotapes activities within 
the store or passers-by on the sidewalk, the police are not required to articulate 
any grounds for obtaining the video to use it in an investigation, because what 
it records is public activity: Any random member of the public may observe 
it, and so the actor has no privacy right in the publicly observable part of the 
transaction.91 Criminal investigations often proceed by collecting information 
that is available to be seen by others, and hence is “public” in this sense.
Up to this point, the connection between what a person does in public and 
what the police may acquire, on a warrantless and groundless basis, may seem 
perfectly sensible. In what is known as the “third-party doctrine,” this idea has 
been taken one step further, and treats many transactions as public even though 
89. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 32(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. Section 32(1) of the Charter 
states that it applies:
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of 
Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the 
authority of the legislature of each province.
 See also McKinney v University of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229 at 262, 76 DLR (4th) 545; 
R v Dell, 2005 ABCA 246 at para 6, 256 DLR (4th) 271 (“the Charter only applies to 
government actions, not interactions between private citizens”) citing Schreiber v Canada 
(Attorney General), [1998] 1 SCR 841 at para 27, 158 DLR (4th) 577.
90. See supra notes 29, 40.
91. See note 29 and the accompanying text above.
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they are not observable in the same way as in the examples above. In the version 
adopted by the US courts, information available to any third party, even one 
acting in a quasi-fiduciary capacity (e.g., a bank or phone company), is deemed 
“public” and so is freely available to the police according to the same logic.92 But 
although a deposit includes details shared with bank personnel, it can hardly 
sustain the same analogy to “public exposure” as a transaction in a convenience 
store. The mistake, then, is to conclude that whatever an individual shares with 
anyone else should be treated as public. Notably, no one has offered a normative 
argument in favour of the third-party doctrine; on the contrary the normative 
arguments all cut the other way.93
The confusion underlying the “loss of control” theory is a product of this 
tacit and misguided logic. Just because many transactions visible to third parties 
are public, it does not follow that all such transactions are public. Although it 
is permissible for the recipient of a text message to forward it to others, the 
mere possibility of that eventuality does not render the message “public” in the 
same way that a purchase at a convenience store is public. When activity or 
information is not exposed to the public, we should recall the constitutional 
difference between restrictions on state action and on the action of private 
individuals, instead of blithely assuming that whatever some individual might do, 
the state may immediately proceed to do, even when the individual has actually 
done nothing. When the recipient of a message in fact makes it public, even 
without the sender’s permission (e.g., by posting a text message online), the logic 
of the “public exposure” doctrine applies; it hardly makes sense to ask the police 
to avert their gaze from a message that everyone else can observe.94 The sender 
may well perceive it as a betrayal of confidence, just as a police informer may 
92. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries” (2015) 84:2 Fordham L Rev 611.
93. See e.g. Susan Freiwald, “First Principles of Communications Privacy” (2007) [2007] Stan 
Tech L Rev 3; Stephen E Henderson, “Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting 
Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too” (2007) 34:4 Pepp L Rev 
975; Susan W Brenner & Leo L Clarke, “Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy 
Rights in Stored Transactional Data” (2006) 14:1 JL & Pol’y 211; Gerald G Ashdown, 
“The Fourth Amendment and the ‘Legitimate Expectation of Privacy’” (1981) 34:5 Vand L 
Rev 1289 at 1315; Lewis R Katz, “In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first 
Century” (1990) 65:3 Ind LJ 549 at 564–66. One of the few efforts to defend the third-party 
doctrine on any ground is Orin S Kerr, “The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine” (2008) 
107:4 Mich L Rev 561. However, Kerr offers a descriptive account, not a normative one, and 
the factors that go into his description are themselves difficult to pin down. See Simon Stern, 
“The Third Party Doctrine and the Third Person” (2011) 16:3 New Crim L Rev 364.
94. See Hubbard, supra note 80. This is precisely why Hubbard does not support the “loss of 
control” that the Pelucco dissent attributed to it.
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betray the confidence of her former associates—but in both cases, this personal 
betrayal does not translate into a constitutional privacy violation. However, 
when no such action has occurred, and the courts are left instead to hypothesize 
that the recipient might yet post the message, and that consequently it is already 
exposed to the public. The result is to expand the meaning of “public” beyond 
any plausible bounds.
The “loss of control” theory, then, yields a qualified version of the third-party 
doctrine—a doctrine which the Supreme Court of Canada has rejected.95 
More precisely, in R v Duarte the Court rejected a specific version of the 
third-party doctrine, which holds that by sharing information with someone 
else, an individual takes the risk that the other person “will make a permanent 
electronic record … at the behest of the state.”96 The “loss of control” theory 
proceeds along similar but not identical lines, reasoning that when information is 
conveyed to another, and the sender has no legal grounds (deriving from a statute 
or a recognized relationship of confidentiality) for controlling the recipient, the 
information automatically loses its privacy protection, precisely because of the 
sender’s lack of control. The US version of the doctrine cuts even more widely 
because it pays less heed to the legal conditions restricting the recipient’s actions, 
and treats customers’ interactions with banks and credit card issuers as similarly 
open to police search on a warrantless basis.97
The slightly less draconian implications of the qualified version may therefore 
seem more acceptable, but it remains inconsistent with Canadian jurisprudence, 
and it becomes even more obviously untenable when its dimensions are fully 
delineated. It is also worth noting that despite their similar effect, the grounds of 
the third-party doctrine and the “loss of control theory” are somewhat different: 
The US version reflects the idea that what has been revealed to another is thereby 
rendered public—and therefore should be analogized to “public exposure” once 
it has been shared. The version set out in the Marakah dissent assumes that 
control is a sine qua non for privacy—and consequently that when information 
can be shared and controlled (e.g., when it is shared with a regulated entity that 
has certain obligations of confidentiality), it attracts a privacy interest that the US 
95. See e.g. R v Ward, 2012 ONCA 660 at para 76, 112 OR (3d) 321 (“Canadian jurisprudence 
has emphatically rejected the ‘risk’ analysis featured in American Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence … According to that jurisprudence, voluntary disclosure to third parties 
defeats Fourth Amendment claims”) citing Duarte, supra note 74 at 48 and R v Wong (1987), 
1 WCB (2d) 415 at para 45, 19 OAC 365 as examples of such Canadian jurisprudence.
96. Duarte, supra note 74 at 42.
97. See e.g. United States v Miller, 425 US 435 at 440-44, 446 (1976) (banks); United States v 
Phibbs, 999 F (2d) 1053 at 1077-78 (6th Cir 1993) (credit cards).
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version of the doctrine would not support.98 Although neither doctrine has found 
much normative justification, this difference means that the normative critiques 
of the US doctrine do not map readily onto the Canadian version, as I seek to 
show in the next Part.
IV. THE PRIVACY INTEREST
If the “loss of control” theory proves unavailing as a ground for vitiating any 
privacy interest in text messages, what kind of privacy protection should they 
enjoy? On this question, the Marakah majority offers a persuasive answer, but 
offers no normative justification. If we return to the values whose importance has 
been reiterated throughout the privacy jurisprudence—autonomy, dignity, and 
integrity—it is evident that written communications, as a general matter, engage 
all three interests, even when they are not somehow marked out as especially 
private, or sent to fiduciaries or quasi-fiduciaries. In this Part, I attempt to provide 
that normative justification, and show why reasonable suspicion is enough to 
overcome the privacy interest, when the police can offer objective grounds for 
suspecting that particular individuals are involved in a criminal conspiracy.
E. THE OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT
In spite of the many factors animating the various tests on offer, analyses of privacy 
often turn in the end on the question of whether a claimant’s expectation of 
privacy was “objectively reasonable.” As the courts have explained, an “objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy” is one that “society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable,”99 and it refers to “a normative rather than a descriptive standard.”100 
This is not the place for an extended discussion of the difference between the 
normative and the descriptive, but it is worth noting, in passing, that for this kind 
of inquiry, empirical evidence is useful only insofar as it bears on norms, or allows 
us to infer norms from practices. To content oneself with a list of practices and the 
beliefs underlying them, as courts often do, reveals nothing about norms because 
people often regard certain practices or attitudes as commonplace, while also 
viewing them as normatively objectionable. Therefore, empirical evidence, drawn 
from practices, may not be very helpful in showing what society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.
98. See supra note 76. Under the US third-party doctrine, the information shared with these 
entities is not entitled to constitutional privacy protection.
99. R v M(A), supra note 13 at para 33.
100. Tessling, supra note 21 at para 42.
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If we pursue the analogies to letters and conversations, proposed earlier, 
it is evident that the same normative logic governs all of these forms of 
communication. A conversation on a park bench or on a public street, no matter 
how private the topic, merits little protection if it is loud enough to be overheard 
by a police officer strolling by; society would not be prepared to recognize the 
interlocutors’ expectation of privacy as reasonable. The same is true for a text 
message that the recipient displays in public (even though the sender forbade it). 
To be sure, electronic forms of communication are likelier than paper-and-ink 
correspondence to be widely distributed, or to become publicly visible. But 
when neither the sender nor the recipient has actually done anything to make 
a text message available to others, society is prepared to recognize the sender’s 
expectation of privacy as reasonable.
No detailed empirical research or philosophical theory is required to see this 
because the analogy to other forms of written communication readily shows why 
the expectation is objectively reasonable. One need only turn to the history of 
the Fourth Amendment in the United States to see why a belief in the privacy of 
written communications is objectively reasonable, as a general matter. As every 
historian of criminal procedure knows, the provisions of the Fourth Amendment 
(and thus, ultimately, of section 8 of the Charter in turn) were prompted in 
large part by hostility towards the British use of “general warrants”—open 
search warrants, naming no individual in particular, that allowed government 
“messengers” to search the homes and offices of anyone they chose, and to seize 
whatever they found. More specifically, the Fourth Amendment was a response 
to the use of general warrants during the investigation of John Wilkes and his 
associates for their involvement in The North Briton in 1763.101 General warrants 
were objectionable because of the indiscriminate searches that they licensed, and 
letters were among the many documents that government agents collected, during 
these searches. In the course of the Wilkes investigation, one of the messengers 
ransacked the home of the bookseller George Kearsley, “prob[ing] every bureau 
and drawer in his house, [and] confiscat[ing] his account books, letters, and 
notes at will,”102 seeking correspondence from Wilkes. In one of the lawsuits 
that followed, it was alleged that the messengers had “examined all the private 
papers, books, letters and correspondence of the plaintiff and his clients.”103 
101. See e.g. Laura K Donohue, “The Original Fourth Amendment” (2016) 83:3 U 
Chicago L Rev 1181.
102. William John Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 1602-1791 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 441.
103. Beardmore v Carrington (1764), 2 Wils KB 244, 95 ER 790.
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Anger about these large-scale searches led to the adoption of a constitutional 
prohibition on unreasonable searches that violate “[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”104 The generality of the 
general warrants was the most important reason for adopting this measure, and 
by referring specifically to “papers” and “effects,” this language makes it clear that 
its protections extend to letters.
One consequence of a theory that treats text messages and letters in the same 
fashion would be to eliminate some of the contingency we have seen in the analysis 
in Marakah. Recall that according to the majority in Marakah, text messages 
attract a privacy interest just when they are composed in a fashion that creates a 
“zone of privacy”—that is, when they are shielded from others’ eyes.105 In the case 
of a letter, anyone who happened to observe the process of its composition would 
be free to tell others about it, including the police—but it would not follow that if 
the police conducted a warrantless and groundless search that happened to yield 
that letter, they would be free to use it in court. Marakah’s treatment of the “zone 
of privacy,” however, seems to yield precisely that result for text messages. Again, 
the author of a letter often has no control at all over what the recipient does with 
it—and yet the sender’s inability to regulate access to the information has little 
bearing on the privacy interest that attaches to it. By contrast, Marakah secures 
protection for text messages only when there is “shared control,” leaving open the 
implication that text messages do not necessarily enjoy Charter protection when 
such control is shown to be absent. In short, a theory that looks to the social 
interests in protecting written correspondence, as a general matter, would result 
in a more categorical form of protection for text messages, eliminating some of 
the contingency that the reasoning in Marakah allows.
But even if the person who sends a text message has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, it does not follow that the police can have access to the text message 
only when they are executing a warrant that expressly places it within the ambit 
of the search. Generally, when the police receive evidence from someone who 
has lawful possession or custody of it, and who is not under any statutory 
obligation to withhold it, section 8 of the Charter does not apply, because there 
has been no “search” within the meaning of section 8. As the Court explained in 
R v Law, “[t]he principal purpose of s. 8 of the Charter is to protect an accused’s 
privacy interests against unreasonable intrusion by the State.”106 Similarly, 
in R v Gomboc, the Court contrasted “the voluntary cooperation of a private 
104. US Const amend IV.
105. Marakah, supra note 1 at para 37.
106. R v Law, 2002 SCC 10 at para 15, [2002] 1 SCR 227 [emphasis added].
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actor with the police” against a request, by police, that an electric utility install 
a device to record a consumer’s power usage.107 The latter, the Court explained, 
“constitute[d] a search that infringes s. 8 of the Charter.”108 The thrust of these 
statements is to show that a “search” is precisely analogous to a “seizure,” within 
the meaning of section 8. In R v Colarusso, the Court defined a seizure as “the 
taking of something from a person by a public authority without that person’s 
consent.”109 It is the act of a public authority that makes the appropriation a 
seizure. Consequently, as various courts have held, when someone “obtain[s] … 
personal information … as a private citizen” and “provide[s] the information … 
of her own volition” to a state actor, there has been no seizure.110 Analogously, 
when a private individual voluntarily provides a letter or a text message to the 
police, there has been no search. In that case, the state has not intruded on the 
claimant’s privacy interests, and therefore even a heightened privacy interest in 
the communication will not help to justify its exclusion.
This much may seem obvious in the context of letters and emails that a 
recipient voluntarily gives to the police; however, courts have sometimes devoted 
a significant amount of unnecessary space to the analysis of privacy interests in 
such cases. In Lowrey (one of the “child luring” cases), the child’s mother contacted 
the police to report the incident, and the mother and daughter then met with 
police, to whom they “provided … a printed copy of the ‘messages’ exchanged” 
in the course of the online conversations between the child and the claimant.111 
Similarly, in Craig (another “child luring” case), the recipients furnished the 
police with the messages exchanged. As the court noted, “[t]he messages [used 
in evidence] were all from the [social media] accounts of … the witnesses,”112 
namely, the child whom the claimant had been messaging and her two friends, 
who “printed off” the messages themselves and gave them to the police.113 Again, 
in R v Sandhu, the complainant showed the police threatening text messages 
he had received from the accused, and the trial court inquired into the sender’s 
expectation of privacy.114 This approach is misguided. The objective reasonableness 
107. R v Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55 at para 104, [2010] 3 SCR 211.
108. Ibid.
109. R v Colarusso, [1994] 1 SCR 20 at 58, 110 DLR (4th) 297 [Colarusso] [emphasis added] 
citing R v Dyment, [1988] 2 SCR 417 at 431, 55 DLR (4th) 503.
110. R v McBean, 2011 ONSC 878 at para 19, 92 WCB (2d) 878 citing Colarusso, 
supra note 109.
111. Lowrey, supra note 59 at para 9.
112. Craig, supra note 61 at para 42
113. Ibid at paras 8-9, 45.
114. R v Sandhu, 2014 BCSC 2482, [2015] BCWLD 1274.
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of the sender’s expectations has no bearing on the analysis, because the police 
acquired the information through a voluntary act of the recipient. In Sandhu, 
as in Lowrey and Craig, section 8 was never triggered.
Although it is not tenable to say that the sender’s privacy interest vanishes 
because of what the recipient might do with a piece of correspondence, it is a very 
different matter when the recipient in fact shares it with others. That is precisely 
why the “loss of control” argument has a superficial appeal: It correctly describes 
what happens if the recipient actually decides to make the communication 
available to others. If the recipient of a letter turns it over to the police, the 
sender’s privacy interest has no bearing on the letter’s admissibility. There is no 
reason to treat text messages differently.
Similarly, privacy interests are irrelevant when the police acquire evidence in 
the course of a lawful search, such as a search incident to arrest. When evidence is 
properly within the scope of such a search, its admissibility is not in question even 
if the claimant can make out a heightened privacy interest. The proper scope of a 
search incident to arrest has, of course, been vigorously debated, particularly with 
respect to electronic communications, and it is important to stress that the search 
must be narrowly tailored to meet only the purposes justifying such a search, which 
include “collect[ing] and preserv[ing] evidence located at the site of the arrest”115 
so long as the evidence is not “in … danger of disappearing.”116 In R v Fearon, the 
Court noted that searches of cell phones, incident to arrest, “may serve important 
law enforcement objectives” such as “identifying accomplices or locating and 
preserving evidence that might otherwise be lost or destroyed.”117 In such cases, 
the Court explained, the search should be limited to “recently sent or drafted 
emails, texts, photos and the call log … as in most cases only those sorts of items 
will have the necessary link to the purposes for which prompt examination of 
the device is permitted.”118 Within that properly defined scope, a showing of a 
heightened privacy interest as to a certain item makes no difference. When the 
police conduct a search that is a valid exception to the warrant requirement, and 
they do not stray outside the permissible scope of the search, any evidence they 
collect is admissible, whether it is a bus transfer or a personal diary. Fearon notes 
that email and text messages could fall within the scope of the search,119 and to 
115. R v Stillman, [1997] 1 SCR 607 at para 48, 144 DLR (4th) 193.
116. Ibid at para 49.
117. R v Fearon, supra note 20 at para 49.
118. Ibid at para 76.
119. Ibid.
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recognize that is to see that even if a particular text message carried a high privacy 
interest, that would not be a reason for excluding it.
To say, then, that individuals have an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy in letters, emails, and text messages, as a general matter, does not insulate 
these materials from inspection by the police, even when a warrant is lacking. 
If the recipient voluntarily turns it over to the police, or if the correspondence 
comes into view during a search pursuant to arrest, for example, the claimant’s 
privacy interest does not require the suppression of this evidence. The same 
logic should apply when the police have reasonable suspicion to search for the 
particular communication in question, as I show in the next Part.
F. REASONABLE SUSPICION
In cases involving the privacy of text messages, the police of`ten discover the 
incriminating information in the course of a search that was supported by reasonable 
suspicion, though not by grounds sufficient for a warrant. While that standard 
cannot justify a wide-ranging search of every message on a suspect’s phone, or even 
all the recent messages, it can support a narrowly targeted search aimed solely at 
obtaining messages relevant to a crime for which the police are investigating the 
suspect. Allowing a relatively narrow search of this kind would go a long way towards 
answering the concerns of the dissent in Marakah, which suggested that the majority’s 
“all-encompassing approach” would result in the exclusion of text messages from 
“a sexual predator who lures a child into committing sexual acts” and “an abusive 
husband who sends harassing text messages to his ex-wife.”120 In these instances, 
one may doubt that any search at all has occurred if the recipient chooses to turn 
over the incriminating information rather than producing it at the behest of the 
police, but even if these were treated as searches under section 8, the recipient’s 
complaint would be sufficient to create reasonable suspicion as to the messages.
That was precisely the position that the Court adopted in R v Chehil, which 
explained that a search of the claimant’s luggage, performed by a sniffer dog 
that alerted to the presence of drugs, and supported by reasonable suspicion, 
was “authorized by law.”121 The Court noted that such searches are “minimally 
intrusive, narrowly targeted, and can be highly accurate,” and therefore they 
“may be conducted without prior judicial authorization.”122 For the search to 
be legally permissible, there must be a “nexus … between the criminal conduct 
that is suspected and the investigative technique employed”—a requirement that 
120. Marakah, supra note 1 at para 168 (Moldaver J, dissenting).
121. Chehil, supra note 16 at para 1.
122. Ibid.
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was satisfied in Chehil by “a constellation of facts that reasonably support[ed] 
the suspicion of drug-related activity that the dog deployed [was] trained to 
detect.”123 Having established reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect 
was engaged in drug trafficking, the police were authorized to conduct a limited 
search aimed solely at detecting the presence of drugs.
Chehil reached that conclusion because the Court in Kang-Brown had created 
a new common-law power to conduct such a search. As Justice Binnie explained, 
“[i]n my view, where the police comply with the requirements of the Charter, 
they possess the common law authority to make use of sniffer dogs in places 
to which they have lawful access for the purpose of criminal investigations.”124 
He concluded that “a sniffer-dog search is authorized by the common law, and 
the common law itself is reasonable on the basis of reasonable suspicion,” because 
of “the minimally intrusive, narrowly targeted and high accuracy” of such 
a search.125 In creating such a common-law power, Justice Binnie added that 
the Court was “ensuring that the common law reflects current and emerging 
societal needs and values.”126 Ratifying this view, Justice Deschamps noted that 
“the law enforcement duties traditionally recognized at common law are ‘the 
preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime, and the protection of life and 
property.’”127 Those considerations had previously furnished a proper basis, she 
observed, for creating a common-law power to allow the police, on reasonable 
suspicion, to conduct a “random vehicle stop, as part of a program to detect and 
deter impaired driving,” and she reasoned that precisely the same grounds would 
justify “the use of a sniffer dog by the police as an independent investigative tool,” 
based on reasonable suspicion.128 Finally, drawing on the same considerations, 
Justice Bastarache reasoned that where the police “were attempting to identify 
and apprehend individuals carrying illegal drugs, weapons or other contraband 
on Canada’s public transportation systems,” their use of sniffer dogs to pursue 
those goals “falls within the scope of their lawful duties at common law.”129
For the police to have legal authority to search for text messages, in cases 
involving conspiracies to distribute drugs, weapons, or similar contraband, in the 
narrowly targeted fashion described above, would thus require an extension of 
123. Ibid at para 36.
124. Kang-Brown, supra note 15 at para 57.
125. Ibid at para 60.
126. Ibid at para 62.
127. Ibid at para 151 quoting Dedman v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 2 at 32, 20 DLR 
(4th) 321 [Dedman].
128. Kang-Brown, supra note 15 at para 157 [emphasis omitted].
129. Ibid at para 233.
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Kang-Brown and Chehil. The rationales offered in those cases would readily justify 
such an extension. The goals of these different kinds of searches are virtually 
identical; as formulated here, the search of the phone would have to be as 
“minimally intrusive, narrowly targeted and high[ly] accura[te]” as a sniffer dog 
search; and ultimately the search would advance the same law enforcement duties, 
traditionally recognized at common law, as in Kang-Brown and Chehil—namely, 
“the preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime, and the protection of life 
and property.”130 As with the dog-sniff cases, the effect would be to “ensur[e] that 
the common law reflects current and emerging societal needs and values.”131
To date, applications of the “reasonable suspicion” standard have generally 
involved questions of spatial rather than information privacy.132 Consequently, 
analogies to informational privacy may seem awkward at first blush. There is no 
evidently liminal position from which police may detect information, no exterior 
of a phone or computer, where they may hover without touching, or while 
touching only lightly. That view, however, confuses the superficial aspects of the 
jurisprudence, as it has applied so far, with its underlying goals. Searches based 
on reasonable suspicion are easiest to imagine (and to visualize) when they can be 
characterized in physical terms, but the more basic point is that the search must 
be limited and targeted, and must refrain from inquiring into information that is 
not relevant to the search.
In explaining what constitutes reasonable suspicion, courts have explained 
that although it falls short of reasonable and probable grounds, it nevertheless 
depends on “objectively ascertainable facts.”133 In R v M(A), Justice Binnie 
elaborated on the “narrowly targeted” nature of the search:
[T]he dog’s communication capacity is limited to a positive alert or a failure to 
react at all. Unlike a wiretap or a physical search, the police do not obtain a lot of 
information about a suspect that is not relevant to their specific drug inquiry. While 
the suspect has a privacy interest in the place where the drugs are concealed, the fact 
that the sniff will disclose nothing except the presence of illegal drugs in that private 
place is a factor weighing in favour of moving the balance point to the reasonable 
suspicion standard.134
130. Dedman, supra note 127 at 32.
131. Kang-Brown, supra note 15 at para 62 citing R v Mann, 2004 SCC 52 at para 17, [2004] 2 
SCR 59 and Duarte, supra note 74 at 670.
132. For instance, besides the use of sniffer dogs to detect drugs in lockers, the courts have used 
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Analogously, reasonable suspicion would permit the police to look only for 
messages received from other particular individuals who have already been 
identified as suspects, or messages received within a narrow time frame, specified 
in advance, which the police have identified as a period during which the suspects 
were planning or committing the crime. Any messages not relevant to the crime 
under investigation are irrelevant and should be excluded, and if the search for 
messages from other, previously identified suspects yields no results, the question 
of false positives does not even arise.
In R v M(A), Justice Binnie acknowledged that “the suspect has a privacy 
interest in the place where the drugs are concealed,” but he did not conclude 
that reasonable suspicion was insufficient to overcome that interest.135 Rather, 
he proposed that reasonable suspicion afforded the right “balance point” 
for the kind of limited search he described.136 In R v Melesko, similarly, the 
court observed that “a reasonable suspicion standard may be sufficient where 
the investigative technique is relatively non-intrusive and the expectation of 
privacy not too high.”137 Thus, to say that individuals have the same reasonable 
expectation of privacy in all forms of written communication—letters, emails, 
and text messages—does not necessarily translate into the consequence that none 
of them are available to the police unless they are acting under a warrant or an 
exception to the warrant requirement. In most instances, none of the factors 
in Plant will apply to create a heightened privacy interest. This is particularly 
true for most communications sent between individuals who are conspiring to 
commit a crime. The interest that attaches, then, is the basic privacy interest 
applicable to written communication as a general matter. That interest would 
bar the police from undertaking random and groundless searches, in the hope of 
finding evidence of criminality. Consequently, this approach would insulate the 
vast majority of such communications from any police search, while permitting 
the police to search only when they have objectively ascertainable facts as to a 
specific crime, and as to specific individuals.
Pelucco and Marakah offer appropriate settings for the use of this standard. 
In both cases, the police had objective grounds, short of reasonable and probable 
grounds, to search the suspects’ phones for text messages related to the crimes 
under investigation. In both cases, the police appear to have conducted a 
minimally intrusive and appropriately targeted search, aimed only at the messages 
relating to those crimes. In both cases, the Crown contended that text messages 
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. R v Melesko, 2010 ABPC 384 at para 158, [2011] AWLD 872.
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are categorically exempt from protection under section 8, and therefore did not 
propose any alternative ground for admissibility, such as that the evidence was 
admissible under the standard of “reasonable suspicion.” Going forward, the 
adoption of this approach would give the public greater security in the privacy 
of their communication, while also giving the police clear guidance on how to 
conduct a Charter-compliant search for electronic communications.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the Court’s effort to craft a categorical approach to the treatment of text 
messages in Marakah, the judgment rests on several considerations that leave 
future cases dependent on the particular circumstances that arise. Moreover, 
on Marakah’s reasoning, the circumstances that drive the outcome are not 
grounded in normative concerns that help to explain why most people would 
attach a high privacy value to written correspondence of nearly any kind. 
A simpler approach, based on social norms, would only offer better protection 
for text messages while giving the law more predictability. At the same time, 
a standard of reasonable suspicion for a limited search—akin to the sniffer dog 
searches permitted by Kang-Brown and Chehil—would enhance the ability of 
police to conduct investigations without jeopardizing the privacy status of text 
messages as a general matter. Some might contend that an even more purely 
categorical approach—endowing all text messages with a privacy interest and 
refusing to permit any warrantless searches—would be even more desirable. 
While that view has some plausibility, the jurisprudence applying the standard of 
reasonable suspicion offers a well-developed basis for an approach that achieves 
largely the same goals, while also adapting the common law to “current and 
emerging societal needs and values,” in a fashion that answers the needs of the 
police while also protecting the public.
